Introduction
In December 2007, the U.S. economy began contracting and over the course of the following To put the economy on a better footing for long-term growth, the Recovery Act made strategic investments in clean energy, education, and health care. The Recovery Act's stimulus equaled about 5.5% of GDP over 2+ years and represented the "boldest countercyclical fiscal action in American history" (CEA 2009, p. 1) . The Recovery Act included more than $90 billion in strategic clean energy investments intended to promote job creation and promote deployment of low-carbon technologies (CEA 2010a; Figure 1 ). In terms of spending, the clean energy package has been described as the nation's "biggest energy bill in history" (New York Times 2009).
The strategic stimulus investment in clean energy served as the Administration's first major step in implementing President Obama's approach to advancing energy and climate policy. The short-term supply-side support for clean energy technologies made a significant down payment on the energy investment necessary to cut greenhouse gas emissions and reduce reliance on oil. The second step focused on ramping up R&D, through annual budgets and the Recovery Act, to improve the scientific foundation for new energy technologies. These first two steps complemented the President's proposal for an economy-wide cap-and-trade regime to cut greenhouse gas emissions more than 80% by 2050 and finance R&D and lower effective labor taxes through allowance auctions (Office of Management and
Budget [OMB] 2009).
The Recovery Act represented an unprecedented investment in clean energy; in comparison, the Clinton Administration proposed a Climate Change Technology Initiative with $6.3 billion spread over five years. The Recovery Act's $90 billion in clean energy spending leveraged more than $100 billion in private capital for investments in manufacturing, power generation, and the residential and commercial building sectors to advance the deployment of energy efficiency, wind, solar, geothermal, biomass, lowcarbon fossil fuel, and other technologies. Tailoring of policies to the challenges posed by the financial crisis drove investment in renewable power. Extending tax credits and providing grants for wind power generation resulted in a 60% increase in wind capacity in two years -an investment three times greater than forecast without the Recovery Act. In contrast, energy loan guarantees have not had a meaningful impact on the power sector and are neither sufficient nor necessary to mobilize renewable investment.
To provide a preliminary assessment of the Recovery Act's clean energy package, this paper reviews the rationale, design, and implementation of the act. The first section surveys the policy principles for clean energy stimulus. The second section describes the process of crafting the clean energy package during the 2008-2009 Presidential Transition. The third section identifies the key elements of the Recovery Act's clean energy package. Then, the paper reviews the initial employment, economic activity, and energy outcomes associated with these energy investments. The fifth section provides a more detailed case study on the Recovery Act's support for renewable power through grants and loan guarantees. The final section concludes with lessons learned.
Policy Principles for Clean Energy Stimulus
Larry Summers spoke of the economic conditions that necessitated fiscal stimulus: "Our policy approach started with a major commitment to fiscal stimulus. Economists in recent years have become skeptical about discretionary fiscal policy and have regarded monetary policy as a better tool for short-term stabilization. Our judgment, however, was that in a liquidity trap-type scenario of zero interest rates, a dysfunctional financial system, and expectations of protracted contraction, the results of monetary policy were highly uncertain whereas fiscal policy was likely to be potent" (Summers 2009 ).
Given weak aggregate demand and the already aggressive use of monetary policy tools, many economists considered the case for fiscal stimulus to be strong (Feldstein 2008; Stone and Cox 2008) .
A well-designed fiscal stimulus aims to increase near-term economic output to make up at least some of the output gap without accelerating inflation. By increasing aggregate demand in the shortterm through deficit spending, the government tries to shift some consumption and investment from the future, when the economy is expected to be closer to full utilization of its resources than the current time period. Given this objective for fiscal stimulus, several policy principles can inform the design of a stimulus package.
A number of economists recommended "timely, targeted, and temporary" fiscal stimulus (the "3 Ts"; Summers 2008 , Bernanke 2008 , Stone and Cox 2008 , Elmendorf and Furman 2008 .
2 A timely package pumps resources into the economy when it is most in need, i.e., when there is a large output gap. A timely stimulus would have ideally begun in 2008 and legislative enactment likely represented the most significant "avoidable delay" for fiscal stimulus (Auerbach et al. 2010) .
A targeted package directs resources to the economy in a way that maximizes the stimulus bang for the buck. Those most adversely impacted by the recession are likely to benefit more from a given stimulus dollar and have a higher marginal propensity to consume, which increases the effective multiplier for that stimulus dollar. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) Recovery Act assessment showed that government purchase of goods and services (e.g., many components of the clean energy package), has the highest estimated GDP multipliers, followed closely by transfers to state and local governments (e.g., highway construction) and transfers to individuals (e.g., unemployment insurance), while tax cuts yield lower multipliers because some of the untaxed income is saved for future consumption (CBO 2009).
A temporary package reduces the risk that the stimulus pulse becomes a long-term increase in deficit spending. The perception of permanent larger future deficits could weaken business confidence and potentially increase long-term interest rates, which would counter the stimulus package's intended effect in promoting economic activity (Summers 2008) .
In addition to the 3-T principles for crafting fiscal stimulus generally, the design of a clean energy package should reflect policy principles specific to the objectives of the clean energy agenda.
Investments in clean energy should target various externalities, in particular, carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. While subsidies for zero-emitting sources and associated technology are not as efficient as taxing the emitting sources (Metcalf 2009b) , the obvious policy constraint of a stimulus package focuses attention on subsidies. The public policy need to promote innovation due to the public good nature of knowledge suggests consideration of orienting stimulus funds to R&D as well. Effective targeting of subsidies to externalities requires the government to minimize resources for those projects that would have happened without public support (i.e., inframarginal subsidies) and resources for those projects that should never have happened (i.e., subsidies for projects that will very likely fail even with public support). Promoting a long-term transformation to a less polluting, more diverse and therefore more robust, energy economy also strengthens the foundation for long-term economic growth.
The challenge in crafting an effective fiscal stimulus reflects the effort necessary to weight these various principles. Some clean energy investments can be timely, substantial, and mitigate pollution externalities (e.g., grants for renewable power projects). Some clean energy investments, while substantial and combat climate change, would risk being neither timely nor temporary (e.g., nuclear power plant projects have licensing and construction timeframes on the order of a decade). In late January 2009, the Administration called on Congress to complete a stimulus package that would spend out 75% of the stimulus funds within 18 months (effectively by the end of Fiscal Year 2010). For some programs, this trade-off manifest in a longer "tail" for clean energy spending, i.e., stimulus activities occurring 18 months or more after passage of the Recovery Act, and for some others it meant exclusion from the stimulus package. In concert, these principles guided the design of the Recovery Act's clean energy package such that it focused on investments that could drive job creation and economic activity, while reducing carbon pollution. The energy and environmental working group evaluated a large number of policy proposals for economic stimulus. We identified campaign proposals that could be mobilized quickly. For example, extending the renewable power production tax credit, increasing the weatherization of low-income homes, ramping up energy R&D, advancing smart grid technology, and supporting clean coal technology reflected positions President Obama took during the campaign. We received many unsolicited ideas from NGOs, businesses, trade associations, academics, and private citizens. Several think tanks published their stimulus ideas (e.g., Hendricks and Goldstein 2008) . During the Transition, we held many meetings with energy, environmental, and financial stakeholders to identify the areas of greatest need and ways to effectively address those needs.
Crafting the Clean Energy Package
In our assessment of stimulus proposals, we asked a variety of questions motivated by our stimulus policy principles. Are the projects "shovel ready?" Do implementing agencies have the staff, experience, and capacity to deploy new resources effectively and promptly, or should the Act enhance agency capacity? Will a ramp up of Federal support leverage private financing? Can the policies be implemented through existing authorities, or do we need new legislative authorities? Are these earmarks (which the President opposed)? How much bang for the buck, in terms of employment, economic activity, and changes in the energy system, are we getting? Do these policies reduce CO2
emissions?
As the economist on the Transition Team's energy and environmental working group, I served as the liaison with the shadow economic agencies. This role involved undertaking the initial economic and budgetary vet of all ideas that came to our working group before we decided whether to run them by the appropriate shadow economic team staff. This evolved into an iterative process, especially with the shadow OMB, as we would discuss how to map a given energy investment objective to a policy instrument and an existing authority (or identify the need for a new authority), assess the quarterly spend-out rate, and then score the potential appropriation. As a reflection of how quickly the stimulus target moved during this time, in one meeting with the shadow OMB, I was informed that "we were not spending enough" on the clean energy package, which at that time was smaller than the final version in the Recovery Act. accelerating replacement/retrofits of heavy-duty diesel engines; and,  Clean Energy: promoting renewable power through production tax credits and loan guarantees; demonstrating carbon capture technology at coal plants.
The January staff-level negotiations included several long, intense meetings as we went through every detail of the proposed clean energy package. In this productive back-and-forth, we discussed policy priorities, spending levels, the applicability of existing authorities, and the need to draft new authorities. The general approach, energy priorities, and many specific proposals included in our initial
December presentation were reflected in the clean energy package of the Recovery Act signed into law.
The staff from the authorizing committees identified provisions in the 2005 and 2007 energy bills that we could employ and/or modify to achieve several of our policy priorities. In the case of the energy loan guarantee program, we worked with Hill staff to expand the program to support conventional renewable technologies in addition to innovative technologies covered by the existing section 1703
program. In some cases, we had an extensive discussion on the feasibility of spending a given level of resources on specific programs in a prompt manner. For example, appropriators raised questions about the rate of spend-out in a ramped-up weatherization program (which did spend out slowly in 2009). On some issues, Hill staff recommended alternative existing authorities to meet our desired policy priority.
For example, in lieu of channeling all state energy monies through the State Energy Program, we agreed to split funding between this program and the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant program, which could deliver monies directly to local entities and set aside some funds for competitive grant purposes.
While the enacted version of the Recovery Act reflected our four major energy themes of efficiency, transportation, the grid, and clean energy, the grid-related stimulus provisions involved significant work with Congressional staff. Per the suggestion of Hill staff, we used, with some modifications, the smart grid provisions in Title XIII of the 2007 energy bill to advance the smart grid proposal. Some renewable power advocates in the stakeholder community called for an "interstate transmission highway system" of electricity transmission to enable remote renewable power resources to be brought to market (e.g., AWEA 2008). While some likened this investment in transmission to the investment in the Eisenhower interstate highway system, there are some fundamental differences that are important in the stimulus context. Unlike freeways, which rely almost exclusively on public financing, transmission has a well-established history of private financing with regulated economic returns through the setting of transmission fees on consumers' utility bills. For those regions in which public financing is relevant, as a result of the presence of Federal power marketing administrations, we worked to enhance the borrowing authority for WAPA and Bonneville to increase transmission capacity.
Expanding the transmission system is constrained much more by siting (NIMBY) and cost-allocation issues than it is about the availability of financing. Thus, increasing monies for transmission may not necessarily overcome these non-financial constraints, and certainly not in a relatively short stimulus timeframe. While we discussed various ways in which Federal funds could be used to drive innovative thinking among states to resolve siting and cost-allocation issues, the lack of an existing legislative authority and the absence of a consensus around the design and effectiveness of such an idea rendered it moot. 
Elements of the Clean Energy Package
The Recovery Act provided more than $90 billion in public spending and tax expenditures in efficiency, and transit, the categories of activity that received the largest share of stimulus funds ( Table   2 ).
The Recovery Act leveraged significant "co-investment" from the private sector, state and local governments, and non-profits and universities. In the CEA (2010b) review of leveraging through the Recovery Act, about $46 billion in clean energy investments leveraged more than $100 billion in private sector and non-Federal government clean energy spending. This represents more than 37% of all leveraged co-investment identified in the Recovery Act by CEA.
The leveraging of non-Federal resources for clean energy investment takes several forms.
Department of Energy cost-sharing grants for smart grid projects mobilized more than $4.5 billion of coinvestment from a $3.4 billion Recovery Act expenditure. The Recovery Act's clean energy manufacturing tax credit, with a total tax expenditure cap of $2.3 billion, supported 183 manufacturing facilities with a co-investment of as much as $5.4 billion. 7 Clean Renewable Energy Bonds, by providing interest subsidies through the tax code, leverage investment in renewable power for public and quasipublic utilities.
These energy investments have begun to drive changes in the energy system. The
Weatherization Assistance Program encountered some initial delays, but the program weatherized nearly 300,000 homes in 2010 (triple the annual average over [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] , and the Department of Energy expects to weatherize approximately 600,000 homes with Recovery Act funding. 8 The Act increased the per residence spending cap from $2,500 to $6,500 to account for changes in material costs over time and to provide resources for more extensive energy efficiency improvements. While a variety of engineering-based studies suggest that the weatherization program's efficiency improvements could meaningfully reduce energy consumption and energy bills, additional economic research could better estimate the potential energy-related benefits of the weatherization program.
President Obama set an ambitious goal to double non-hydroelectric renewable power generating capacity within three years based on the Recovery Act. 9 The EIA ( 10 Some of this decline reflected coal-to-gas fuel switching, but total fossil fuel power generation declined 1.6% reflecting the increasing share of renewable power over this two-year period. 11 The increasing share of renewable power reduced power sector emissions by about 2%, representing 43 MMTCO2 fewer emissions in 2010.
Case Study: Promoting Investment in Renewable Power
The Recovery Act dedicated the largest share of the clean energy package to support renewable power generation. This section describes and compares the design and performance of the two primary Recovery Act policies focused on promoting renewable power: the 1603 grant program and the 1705 loan guarantee program.
The prospects for renewable power investment in late 2008 were poor due to three market obstacles. First, project developers faced uncertainty regarding the status of the production tax credit (PTC) for wind, geothermal, and most other forms of renewable power and the investment tax credit (ITC) for solar power projects that were set to expire on December 31, 2008. In October 2008, these tax credits were extended for one year for wind, for two years for most other renewables, and for seven years for solar. While the PTC has subsidized wind power since 1992, the three occasions in the 2000s when the credit lapsed, investment in new wind generating capacity collapsed (Metcalf 2009a) . The PTC provides a tax credit of 2.2¢/kWh of wind generation for the first ten years of a facility's operation. income tax liability necessary to claim tax credits would go to the "tax equity" market in order to use a PTC or ITC. Raising tax equity involved entering into a financial partnership with a passive partner that provides equity and in return would claim the tax credits, accelerated depreciation benefits, and other tax benefits against its taxable income. Given the size of the required income tax liability, large financial corporations (e.g., AIG and Lehman Brothers) typically provided tax equity to renewable project developers. During the financial crisis, the number of tax equity suppliers and the amount of tax equity fell by more than half (U.S. PREF 2010), while the cost of tax equity to project developers, reflected by the return on tax equity paid to the supplier, increased from about 7% to 15% (Schwabe et al. 2009 ).
Thus, a tax credit extension could have had a very limited impact on renewable investment in a shrinking tax equity market. 12 The PTC is indexed to inflation. It is lower for some other types of renewable power. program typically makes decisions on grant applications within four to six weeks, and is required to do so legally within 60 days of receipt of an application (Martin. et al 2009) . In contrast, the 1705 program involves many more staff and takes six months or more to evaluate and work with a project developer before reaching a loan guarantee decision. This difference in timing reflects fundamental differences in the approaches of these two policies. The 1603 grant program confirms that a given project qualifies for a grant -i.e., it employs an eligible renewable technology and that it has entered into service -and then awards a grant. In the 1705 loan guarantee program, the government effectively becomes another financial partner in a project and the staff must negotiate extensive term sheets with project sponsors.
Many issues can complicate this effort -e.g., local, state, and Federal permitting and licensing reviews, finalizing engineering, procurement, and construction contracts, status of long-term power purchase agreements, lifetime project monitoring, etc. -that are by definition resolved when a project enters into service and can be considered for a 1603 grant. In contrast, the 1705 loan guarantee program has not had a meaningful impact on the U.S.
power sector. The pipeline of quality renewable power projects in the 1705 program did not materialize, and the program has focused its efforts on a small number of large wind and solar projects.
A failure to elaborate explicit loan guarantee program energy and investment policies that would inform priority setting in case-by-case review of applications has also undermined program effectiveness. The loan guarantee program also poses long-term fiscal risk to the Federal government, especially if project defaults in the future occur with a greater frequency or with less recoverable value than currently expected and thus exceed the resources set aside under the Recovery Act to guarantee the 1705 program project debt. 16 While the 1603 grant and underlying tax credits were necessary for renewable generation investment, the loan guarantees were not sufficient and do not appear to be necessary for the vast majority of renewable generation projects.
In light of the multiple instruments promoting renewable power, the total financial support result from government policies per ton of CO2 abated can inform assessments of the economic efficiency of the sum of renewable policies. The share of a project financed by taxpayers or ratepayers (through higher electricity rates under a state renewable electricity standard) would likely exceed 60%
for renewable projects receiving tax benefits, grants, loan guarantees, and above-market rates due to state renewable mandates. This raises questions about the efficiency and the bang-for-the-buck of renewable-related promotion policies that further research should explore. 
Lessons Learned
The experience with the Recovery Act's clean energy package provides a variety of lessons for the design and implementation of economic stimulus and for energy policy more broadly. Confidence about the availability of a future market in which to sell goods and services is the cheapest form of economic stimulus (Summers 2010) . Given the extent of the public-private co-investment in the clean energy package, businesses could have benefitted considerably by the regulatory certainty that energy and climate legislation would have provided. The combination of a stimulus package and a well-designed greenhouse gas cap-and-trade program could have driven more investment during this time of weak aggregate demand. In a world with only the clean energy fiscal stimulus, the uncertainty about the prospect of Clean Air Act greenhouse gas regulation likely imposes a drag on the potential economic activity in the energy space.
Significant Job
Need for Rigorous Evaluation. The Recovery Act represents the largest energy spending bill in U.S. history. The broad array of policy instruments and significant variation in how states and local governments implement the Recovery Act's energy-related funds provides opportunities to understand the effectiveness of various deployment policies. Rigorous program evaluation could assess the effects of various instruments on incremental investment, evaluate the impact of technology deployment on energy outcomes, and investigate the cost-effectiveness of multiple instruments, including whether the total government subsidy for a given activity is socially excessive. Let me offer three suggestions. www.recovery.gov), but some of the data will require outreach to state and local governments.
Grants Deliver More Benefits Per Dollar of Government Expenditure than Tax Credits for
Renewable Power. It is difficult to identify a public policy rationale for a renewable program design that results in the creation of a tax equity market and a 7+% cut for large financial firms on every dollar of tax expenditure associated with renewable projects. Using the tax code to support renewables has introduced this transaction cost of monetizing tax credits through the tax equity market for many project developers. Under the Recovery Act 1603 grant, developers receive more of the government tax expenditure than before, and the government does not face a materially higher risk of fraud. (It's not easy to fake a renewable power project sending electricity to the grid.) This option to take a grant in lieu of a tax credit, while intended to address the contraction of the tax equity market during the financial crisis, could be continued for as long as the government decides it is socially desirable to provide support for renewables through the tax code.
Grants and Tax Credits Are Significantly More Effective than Loan Guarantees. Some advocates
for energy loan guarantees pose the question: Can renewable project sponsors raise debt? The question should be: Can these sponsors raise debt at a cost that makes the economics of the project work?
Project risk affects the cost of debt, and therefore the risk-return balance for equity investors, but a loan guarantee is not the only way to alter this risk-return balance. Providing certain government financingthrough a production tax credit or an investment tax credit or cash grant -can increase a projects'
returns by lowering the amount of private sector capital that needs to be raised for a project.
Thousands of renewable projects have moved forward with Recovery Act grants and tax credits and lowered CO2 from what they would have been otherwise, illustrating that these instruments are sufficient to mobilize incremental investment. In contrast, the Recovery Act appropriated $6 billion for energy loan guarantees and 22 months later Congress had rescinded about 60% of this appropriation and the Department of Energy had closed on only eight projects, illustrating that these credit instruments are neither necessary nor effective. Billions of $
